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The decision to locate, relocate or expand a business can be
influenced by a number of factors. Some of them cannot easily be
changed or created by a government simply to attract new invest-
ment. Among these factors are the availability and cost of suitable
transportation, adequate raw materials, cheap and plentiful power
sources, and proximity to prime markets. Additionally, cost of liv-
ing, recreational facilities, school systems, medical services, level of
cultural activities, and climate may all be factors.1
It is widely believed that the right-to-work laws authorized by
section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act 2 play an important role in
attracting and holding business. These laws, in essence, prohibit
* Assistant Professor of Law, Capital University Law School; J.D., cum laude, Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1976; M.A., B.A., Ohio University, 1973. The author is grateful for the
assistance of Deborah Spadafore and Phillip Harmon in the research and preparation of this
Article.
1. Biscomb, Community Considerations in Corporate Headquarters Locations, INDUS.
DEv., July-August, 1979, at 8. Biscomb concludes that decisions to relocate are highly sub-
jective and are influenced by these "quality of life" factors. Id.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b)(1976).
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involuntary unionism.3 Under such laws, an employee may not be
forced to join a union as a condition of employment.4 Although in
the minority, many states, mostly in the south and west, currently
have right-to-work laws. The motives behind such provisions are
probably mixed, including ideological as well as investment-seeking
motivations. In any event, there is disagreement on whether right-
to-work laws have a part in attracting business investment.5
To attract new business investments, state and local govern-
ments generally offer numerous inducements to businesses. Yet
state and local governments are restricted in spending public mon-
ies for purely private purposes, and this restriction influences the
extent and variety of programs a government entity offers.6 The
inducements which are offered are generally tax incentives, financ-
ing, and industrial training programs.7 It has been noted that "[a]n
fifty states now have central economic development agencies and
extend some form of direct or indirect subsidy to maintain indus-
trial stability and promote expansion.""
Tax incentives are perhaps the most widely used state induce-
ment for attracting and retaining business, but the wisdom of this
type of incentive has been questioned.9 They will, however, con-
3. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 41-7-10 et seq. (1976).
4. Violations of the South Carolina law are a misdemeanor, punishable by fine of $10 -
$1,000, imprisonment from 10 to 30 days, or both. Id. § 41-7-80. In addition a person ad-
versely affected by a violation may bring an action for appropriate relief. Id. § 41-7-90.
5. Compare Kovach, National Right to Work Law: An Affirmative Position, 28 LAB.
L. J. 305, 312-313 (1977) (presenting statistics from the United States Department of Com-
merce in such a manner as to suggest greater economic growth in states with right-to work
laws), with Aebi & McLean, Right-To-Work Laws and Industrial Expansion, INDIANA Bus.
REV., September-October, 1978, at 7 (concluding right-to-work laws have no significant im-
pact on industrial growth).
6. See Note, Legal Limitations on Public Inducements to Industrial Location, 59
COLUM. L. REv. 618 (1959). The Note surveys various types of inducements which have been
used by local governments in attempting to attract industry, including gifts of money or
land, bond plan financing, and site acquisition. The author discusses limitations on the use
of these inducements, particularly the public purpose doctrine.
7. See Dempsey, Primary Tax Incentives for Industrial Investment In The South-
eastern United States, 25 EMORY L. J. 789 (1976); Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incen-
tives for Foreign Direct Investment In The Southeastern United States, 9 VAN. J. TRms-
NAT'L. L. 247 (1976). These two articles offer an excellent discussion of the topic of
investment incentives.
8. Note, Industrial Development Bonds: Judicial Construction vs. Plant Construc-
tion, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 262, 268 (1962).
9. See Dempsey, Primary Tax Incentives for Industrial Investment In The South-
eastern United States, 25 EMORY L. J. 789, 810-813 (1976), in which the author discusses
the advisability of offering tax incentives. In Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1958),
[Vol. 57:209
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tinue to be used as long as there is honest belief in their effective-
ness. Tax incentives can take two forms. First, there are those bus-
iness taxes which are levied on everyone, yet provide for
exemptions in certain areas or processes. For example, Ohio ex-
empts manufacturers from sales tax on purchases of packaging
materials 0 and grants credits against corporate franchise taxes for
investments in personal property used in manufacturing."
The second type of tax inducement is more subtle, but poten-
tially more important. No exemption or special consideration is
shown to any particular business on the face of the statute. The
incentive value only appears when the tax rate is compared to that
of neighboring states. For instance, the basic sales tax rate in Mis-
sissippi is five percent, 2 compared to two percent in Louisiana.13
Comparisons could also be made for other taxes. 4
Financing is available in the form of general obligation bonds,
industrial revenue bonds, and direct loans or loan guarantees.1 5 All
the Supreme Court noted that "a statute which encourages the location within the state of
needed and useful industries by exempting them, though not also others, from its taxes is
not arbitrary and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 528.
10. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5739.02(B)(15) (Page 1978 Supp.).
11. Id. § 5733.06.1.
12. Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-17 (1979 Curn. Supp.).
13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:302(A)(1) (West 1970).
14. See generally Dempsey, supra note 7. The articles cited therein compare methods
of taxation among the southeastern states, 25 EMORY L. J. at 794-809; 9 VAND. J. TRANs-
NAT'L. L. at 278-288. It has been suggested that the reason for industrial relocation is not
one of Sunbelt versus Frostbelt, but rather Taxbelt versus Growthbelt. Taxbelt Versus
Growthbelt, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1979, at 20, cols. 1-2. The theory is that states with high
tax burdens stagnate, while those with low tax burdens grow. Id. When states within geo-
graphic areas are compared, such as Massachusetts with New Hampshire and Louisiana
with Texas, a correlation appears to exist between tax burden and growth rate. Id. The
question is whether this is a casual or merely a coincidental relationship. Several studies of
Detroit employers indicate the answer may be somewhat more complex. The studies indi-
cate there may be a factor which can be called "legal climate." Mandel, Quality of Life
Factors in Business Location Decisions, ATLANTA ECON. REv., Jan.-Feb., 1977, at 4. It would
cover "legislative acts, court interpretations, workman's compensation, environmental re-
quirements, local taxes, local ordinances and other such things." Id. It is suggested that
Detroit businesses have voted with their feet in the legal climate referendum by leaving the
city, taking thousands of jobs with them. Id. This appears to have happened in other cities
also. When Diamond Shamrock Corp. announced that it was moving its corporate headquar-
ters from Cleveland to Dallas, one factor it cited as being important was the antibusiness
attitude of the city administration in Cleveland. Wall St. J., May 30, 1979, at 17, cols. 2-5.
See generally, 13th Annual Report-The Fifty Legislative Climates, INDus. DE V., Jan.-Feb.,
1979, at 1.
15. See Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives For Foreign Direct Investment in
the Southeastern United States, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 247, 259-268 (1976), for a thor-
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of these methods are in addition to financing obtained from con-
ventional sources. General obligation bonds16 are generally issued
by municipalities and are backed by the full faith and credit of the
governmental entity issuing them. The proceeds of the bonds may
be used to acquire land for construction or reconstruction of plants
for lease to manufacturers. The industrial revenue bond is the pri-
mary method of financing offered. 17 The proceeds of these bonds
may be used in the same manner as those of general obligation
bonds; however, no full faith and credit pledge is made by the local
government.18 The bonds are sold on the strength of the project
financed, with the interest on the bonds paid and the principal re-
paid from rental payments made by the manufacturer. Due to the
potential for tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code, 9
the rental rates may be quite low. 20 An important feature of both
general obligation and industrial revenue bonds is that one hun-
dred percent financing of a project may be obtained. Financial as-
sistance also may be available in the form of direct loans or loan
guarantees. 21
Many states also offer industrial training programs to attract
business by providing suitable employees. 22 These programs use
ough discussion of industrial financing.
16. See, e.g., The Tennessee Industrial Building Bond Act of 1955, TENN. CODE ANN. §
6-2901 et seq. (1971). The procedures for issuing these bonds are quite cumbersome. In
Tennessee, a community must obtain a certificate of public purpose and necessity from the
state building finance committee. Id. § 6-2905. The committee must find a number of pre-
requisites to be present. Id. § 6-2906 (1978 Cum. Supp.). If a certificate is granted, the
municipality must still put the matter before the voters, where it must be passed by a three-
fourths majority of the registered voters participating in the election. Id. § 6-2907. When
issued, these bonds may be backed by the full faith and credit as well as the unlimited
taxing power of the municipality. Id. § 6-2911 (1971).
17. See, e.g., the Michigan Industrial Development Revenue Bond Act of 1963, MxcH.
COMP. LAWS § 125.1251 et seq. (1970). The procedure under this Act is quite simple, with
publication of a notice to issue the bonds generally being sufficient. An election is required
only upon petition of five percent of the registered voters in the municipality and the bond
issue need only be supported by a majority of the votes cast. Id. § 125.1262. See generally,
Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives For Foreign Direct Investment in the Southeast-
ern United States, 9 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L. L. at 259-267.
18. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-1709 (1971); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 125.1254 (1970).
19. I.R.C. § 103. There are limits on the availability of tax exempt status. Id.
20. In addition, the rental payments by the manufacturer are deductible from gross
income under I.R.C. § 162(a).
21. The Ohio Development Financing Commission, for example, is authorized to make
low interest governmental direct loans. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 122.43 (Page 1978 Supp.).
22. In 1972, twenty-six states had state funded worker training programs. Van Cleve &
Marshall, Start-up Training and Rural Industrial Location, 99 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 23, 23
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existing vocational-technical schools, technical institutes and com-
munity colleges to train or retrain qualified workers for a specific
job or industry. These training services are generally available to
both new and expanding industries.23
In addition, the Internal Revenue Code24 may subsidize a bus-
iness relocation. Expenses incurred by the employer in relocating
may be deductible from gross income as ordinary and necessary
25 ibusiness expenses, and an investment tax credit may be allowable
for new investments. 26 The Internal Revenue Code may provide
other assistance to a relodating employer,27 but these examples
should be sufficient to illustrate the point.
Despite these inducements, many businesses decide to close an
establishment or remove it to a new location. Once made, that de-
cision may have an impact which goes beyond the business itself.
In addition to creating, removing or eliminating jobs in that partic-
ular business, the closing or relocation may have an adverse effect
on other local businesses, the local economy in general, and local
government revenues. A study of the relocation of Associates Cor-
poration of North America from South Bend to Dallas, for exam-
ple, suggests that for every ten jobs exported, an additional thirty-
five jobs in local goods production were lost.2 8 It is not clear that
the impact of worker displacement is solely economic. One writer
has stated that anomie, reduced social interaction, political aliena-
tion, as well as increased chblesterol levels and elevated blood
pressure can result from a plant shutdown or relocation.29 Where
(April, 1976).
23. See Dempsey, supra note 15, at 272-78, surveying the industrial training programs
available in seven of the southern states.
24. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9042 (1976).
25. I.R.C. § 162(a).
26. I.R.C. §8 38, 46 and 48.
27. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 65 and 165(a), which would allow an employer who has disposed
of non-capital assets, such as inventory or office equipment, at a loss, to deduct the loss
from ordinary income. Id. There are situations in which a relocation may have adverse tax
consequences, such as the recapture of investment tax credits or depreciation. See I.R.C. §8
47, 1245 and 1250.
28. Bartholomew, Joray, & Kochanowski, Corporate Relocation Impact, INDANA BUS.
REV., Jan.-Feb., 1977, at 2. After Diamond Shamrock Corporation announced plans to move
its corporate headquarters from Cleveland to Dallas, Cleveland State University Professor
Richard Knight estimated that each corporate headquarters job created ten supporting jobs
in the community. Columbus Dispatch, June 3, 1979, § K, at 8.
29. Mick, Social and Personal Costs of Plant Shutdowns, 14 INDUS. REL. 203 (1975).
Mick analyzed a sixteen-year period in the rubber and plastics industry in Connecticut. Id.
at 205. He concluded that "[e]ven in a dynamic industrial sector enjoying continual growth,
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the effect is economic hardship, the writer suggests that workers
who are older, less skilled, or of a minority group suffer most.3 0
Furthermore, it is clear that geographic areas are disproportion-
ately afflicted with business shutdowns and relocations. Con-
versely, other areas, most notably the so-called sunbelt states, are
blessed with new businesses and business expansions."'
The recent closing of more than twelve plants by United
States Steel Corporation graphically illustrates that the problem is
more than academic. These closings will put 13,000 of the com-
pany's 165,000 employees out of work, with still more workers
threatened with the possibility of additional closings.3 2
To prevent or to mitigate the effects of business closings and
relocations (hereinafter referred to collectively as dislocations), a
number of statutes have been passed and bills introduced. These
statutes and bills provide for payment of benefits to persons ad-
versely affected by a business dislocation, placement of restrictions
or obligations on dislocating businesses, promotion of employee
ownership of potentially dislocating business concerns, or a combi-
nation of these approaches. After a brief look at the role of collec-
tive bargaining agreements in this area, a discussion of existing
and proposed legislation at both the state and federal levels will be
undertaken. Finally, some comments will be made as to potential
constitutional law problem areas.
II. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO BusiNEss
DISLOCATIONS
If an employer is a party to a collective bargaining agreement
with an employee organization, the employees may have rights
under the contract in the event of a dislocation, or the dislocation
itself may be a breach of the agreement. However, the mere exis-
tence of an agreement, without pertinent provisions, will not pro-
a significant number of plants nevertheless are shutting down." Id. at 206.
30. Id. However, Mick states that "[tihe effects on displaced workers remain approxi-
mately the same whether ... in small communities or large industrial cities, in areas of low
or high unemployment, in highly automated plants or in labor intensive plants." Id. at 204.
31. Special Report, The Second War Between The States, Bus. WK., May 17, 1976, at
92-98. The movement of business also carries with it a movement of population and, ulti-
mately, political power. It is estimated, for example, that states in the South and West will
make gains at the expense of states in the North and East, in the House of Representatives.
America's "Sunbelt" is Growing in People and Power, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April
12, 1976, at 58-60.
32. Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1979, at 2, col. 1.
[Vol. 57:209
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tect employees. In International Union v. Hamilton Beach Mfg.
Co.,3 3 a union attempted to obtain an injunction preventing an em-
ployer from relocating its plant to another state. In affirming the
trial court's dismissal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
The fact that companies do move plants is a fact that in
all probability is well known to the negotiators who pre-
pare and enter into collective bargaining agreements. If
the company's right to determine the location of its plant
is to be forfeited or regulated it is a matter that can and
should be done by express provision in the agreement.
There is nothing in the agreement before us that in any
way prohibits plant removal.3 4
An interesting twist, however, can be found in an arbitrator's
decision interpreting a collective bargaining agreement. In Ad-
dress-O-Mat, Inc. v. Retail Employees, District 65,'3 the contract
involved contained a provision prohibiting the employer from re-
moving his plant from the local area. Had the employer attempted
to do that, the union would have had a clear remedy. Instead, the
employer diverted both machinery and business to a new firm
under the control of one of its shareholders and officers. The em-
ployer then laid off a number of employees due to lack of work.
The arbitrator stated that if this action had been taken by the em-
ployer in good faith and for bona fide business reasons, it probably
would have been proper. 6 However, he found the action to have
been in bad faith and for the sole purpose of subverting the intent
of the agreement by taking jobs away from union employees.87 The
award directed the employer to return the machinery and the work
to its plant, reinstate laid-off workers and pay them damages.38
The point here is simple. An action taken solely for reasons of
anti-union animus rather than valid business purposes could be in-
terpreted as an attempt to destroy the rights of employees under
the contract and therefore a violation of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing found in every contract.39
33. 40 Wis. 2d 270, 162 N.W. 2d 16 (1968).
34. Id. 283, 162 N.W.2d at 23.
35. [1961] 61-1 LAB. Aim. AWARDS (CCH) 8158.
36. Id. at 3775.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 3776.
39. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P. 2d 198
(1958) (insurer's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract of insurance was
1980]
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A number of collective bargaining agreements have provisions
dealing with plant closings, relocations and similar situations.
These provisions may provide for advance notice of the dislocation,
or the right to severance pay, retraining or transfer.4 Obviously
the existence or nonexistence of these provisions will depend on
factors such as the union's priorities and its relative bargaining po-
sition. The fact that a collective bargaining agreement provides for
severance pay, however, will not give an employee an option to
forego the severance pay and instead transfer to the employer's
new location.4 1 The employees will still be limited to the rights and
protections actually granted by the contract. Of course, as with any
contract, differences will arise as to the interpretation or applica-
tion of particular provisions. Thus, a question could arise as to
whether a seniority provision in an agreement provides seniority
within a single plant or within the company as a whole.
In sum, the extent of the protection afforded to dislocated em-
ployees under collective bargaining agreements varies from none to
substantial. A union with substantial bargaining power may be
able to gain concessions. 2 It can be expected, in view of continued
business migration to the sunbelt, that unions will bargain harder
in the future for protections against dislocations.
III. STATE STATUTES PERTAINING TO BUSINESS DISLOCATIONS
State statutory provisions dealing with business dislocations
generally take one of two broad approaches. The first is essentially
breached by wrongful denial of coverage and refusal to settle within policy limits); RESTATE-
MNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973) (duty of good faith and
fair dealing).
40. See, e.g., Sterling-Regal Engraving Co. v. LPIU, Local 90-P, [1971] 71-1 LAB. ARB.
AwARDs (CCH) 8390, where the contract being applied provided for six months notice of a
termination of business, six weeks notice of certain relocations, retraining and/or transfer of
employees and payment of severance pay in the amount of one week's salary for each year
of continuous employment.
41. Kollsmans Instrument Corp. v. Office & Professional Employees, [1974] 74-2 LAB.
ARB. AwARDS (CCH) 1 8424.
42. The recent contract between the United Rubber Workers and B. F. Goodrich, for
example, has provisions applicable to plant closure. Among other things, notice must be
given at least six months in advance of a plant closure. Letter from Matthew Contessa,
URW-Goodrich Coordinator, to Philip Harmon (July 5, 1979). Although not specifically
dealing with dislocations, the recent agreement between Chrysler Corp. and the United
Auto Workers giving UAW President Fraser a seat on the Chrysler board of directors is
pertinent. Bus. WL, Nov. 12, 1979, at 93. "As a Chrysler director, Fraser is likely to push for
more worker say in decisions on plant closings." Id.
216 [Vol. 57:209
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to place obligations on a business intending such a course of ac-
tion. The second is to provide benefits to persons adversely af-
fected by the dislocation. Several statutes combine the two
approaches.
The most basic statutory provision is one merely requiring ad-
vance notice to employees. South Carolina law contains a provision
that if an employer within the state requires advance notice from
an employee of when that employee will quit, the employer must
give notice of its intent to shut down not less than two weeks in
advance, or the same length of time in advance as required of em-
ployees before they quit."'
The burden imposed on an employer by this provision is mini-
mal. Furthermore, it is a burden which can be avoided by the em-
ployer, for if the employer does not require notice of intent to quit
from its employees, the statute is inapplicable. The concern of the
law is mandating fair play.
Wisconsin has a somewhat more refined statutory provision.44
It requires an employer employing one hundred or more persons to
give sixty-day written notice to the Department of Industry, Labor
and Human Relations of a decision to merge, liquidate, dispose or
relocate within or without the state, resulting in a cessation of bus-
iness operations affecting employees. The employer is further re-
quired to provide such information as the departm6nt requires
concerning payroll, affected employees and compensation owed the
employees. The department may require submission of a plan for
final payment of wages in full to affected employees.4 5
This provision applies only to relatively large employers, prob-
ably based on the fact that the problems created by totally unan-
ticipated business dislocations are far more acute in such cases.
Furthermore, it is a relatively narrow provision aimed mainly at
ensuring payment of all compensation due affected employees. The
sixty-day notice requirement gives the department adequate time
to achieve the statutory aims by obtaining information from the
43. S.C. CODE § 41-1-40 (1976). The statute is not applicable to shutdowns caused by
an unforeseen accident to machinery, an act of God or an act of a public enemy. A violating
employer is subject to fine of up to five thousand dollars and is liable to employees for
damages caused by failure to give notice. Id.
44. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West 1979-1980 Supp.).
45. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 109.07(1) (West 1979-1980 Supp.). Violation of the statutory
obligations is a misdemeanor and an offending employer may be fined up to $50 for each
employee terminated by the dislocation. Id. § 109.07(2).
19801
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employer and requiring, if necessary, a plan of payment. An in-
dicental effect, however, of the statute is to prevent covered em-
ployers from cbnsumating actions within its purview within a
sixty-day period after the decision to act has been made. While in
many, perhaps most, of the cases in which a business decides to
merge, liquidate or relocate, the decision is made more than sixty
days prior to the planned action, there will be those cases where a
business, absent the statute, would have acted immediately or in
less than sixty days.
In Maine, the statute"' goes one step further. Like the Wiscon-
sin statute, it requires employers of one hundred or more persons47
to give written notice sixty days in advance of dislocation 4 to the
Director of the Bureau of Labor. In addition to the notice obliga-
tion, the statute makes the employer "liable to his employees for
severance pay at the rate of one week's pay for each year of em-
ployment by the employee in such establishment. '49
This statute not only places obligations on the business or em-
ployer in the dislocation situation, but also provides benefits in the
form of severance pay to some of the affected employees. The sev-
erance pay provision, however, does not aid only those employees
who are in fact adversely affected by the dislocation. An employee
who obtains work at similar or even more favorable terms after
separation still receives benefits. Furthermore, apart from separa-
tion benefits under a collective bargaining agreement, other bene-
fits to which the employee is entitled are disregarded. If, then, a
skilled worker employed by a covered establishment at three hun-
46. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-A (West 1979-1980 Supp.).
47. In Maine, it is sufficient if the employer employed 100 or more persons within the
preceding twelve-month period. This closes a potential loophole, i.e., the gradual reduction
of the workforce to below the statutory threshold in order to avoid the statutory obligations,
particularly the severance pay obligation. Id. § 625-A(1).
48. The provision applies to relocations and terminations, both of which are defined in
the statute. A "relocation" is "the removal of all or substantially all of industrial or commer-
cial operations in a covered establishment to a new location, within or without the state of
Maine, 100 or more miles distant from its original location." Id. § 625-A(6). A "termination"
is the "substantial cessation of industrial or commercial operations in a covered establish-
ment." Id. § 625-A(7). The provision would appear not to cover partial relocation or termi-
nation, even if permanent.
49. Id. § 625-A(9). There are four exceptions enumerated in the statute to the liability
for severance pay. They are: a) the dislocation is a result of physical clamity; b) the em-
ployee is covered by an express contractual provision for severance pay; c) the employee
accepts employment at the employer's new location; and d) the employee has been in the
employ of the employer for less than three years. Id. § 625-A(10). "Physical calamity" is
defined to include an adjudication of bankruptcy. Id. § 625-A(5).
[Vol. 57:209
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dred fifty dollars per week is terminated because of a business dis-
location, the worker would receive $10,500 if he or she had been
employed by the employer for thirty years. This would appear to
be true even if the employee obtained similar employment at four
hundred dollars per week, if the employee decided not to work and
retired with a company pension, or if the employee were found to
be entitled to unemployment compensation benefits under the
Maine Employment Security Law.50 It would also appear that
under the Maine Employment Security Law the employee would
not be disqualified from or ineligible for unemployment compensa-
tion benefits because of the payment of separation benefits."1 In
contrast, however, persons with less than three years service with
the employer are not entitled to any separation beneifts regardless
of actual adverse impact of the dislocation on them.52 In short, the
statute provides a windfall for some employees and disregards
others who may be equally deserving.
An interesting Michigan statute takes an entirely different ap-
proach. As discussed above, financial inducements are commonly
believed to be of value in enticing businesses into a location, in
encouraging them to expand, and in keeping them from relocating.
For these reasons, such inducements have been relatively common,
and Michigan has been no exception." The Michigan statute
makes it unlawful to move or abandon a business which has re-
ceived any consideration or inducement from a municipality for
the location, construction, operation or expansion of a business
without restoring the consideration with interest from the date of
the original gift.5 4 The act applies to benefits given to a predeces-
sor company or a company officer or agent,55 and violations of the
Act are a misdemeanor.56 The provision is inapplicable, however, if
50. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1041-251. (West 1964).
51. See § 1193(5), relating to disqualification for benefits based on the receipt of re-
muneration. Id. See § 1043(17) and (19) (West 1979-1980 Supp.), defining "unemployment"
and "wages". Id. Cf. Dubois v. Employment Security Comm'n, 150 Me. 494, 114 A.2d 359
(1955), wherein it was held that employees' entitlement to unemployment benefits was unaf-
fected by receipt of one week's pay for each year of service in a lump-sum payment pursu-
ant to a collective bargaining agreement upon retirement. The court's reasoning in that case
would appear applicable to separation benefits under the Maine statute.
52. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-A(10) (West 1979-1980 Supp.).
53. See, e.g., Industrial Development Revenue Bond Act of 1963, MICH. CoMP. LAWS
§§ 125.1251-.1267 (1970).
54. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 445.601 (1970).
55. Id. § 445.602.
56. Id. § 445.603. The penality provision is § 445.604 and it subjects individuals to
21919801
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the corporation or company received the inducement or considera-
tion for erecting, constructing, enlarging or maintaining a business
or establishment at a city, town or place "for a specified length of
time and [has] fully complied with all conditions of the contract
"57
This provision insures that cities, towns, villages and counties
get at least what they bargain for when they offer inducements to
businesses. If the inducement is linked as consideration for a com-
mitment of definite duration, the statute becomes inapplicable
when the business fulfills the obligation. If the inducement is not
in return for a time-limited commitment, the statute essentially
treats it as a loan which comes due, with interest, when the condi-
tion motivating the gift no longer obtains. In any event, the appli-
cation of the statute can be avoided by expressly limiting the obli-
gation of the business at the inception of the contract.
Finally, every state and the District of Columbia currently has
an unemployment compensation act.58 An employee who is out of
work due to a dislocation may be entitled to receive unemployment
compensation benefits. The benefits are financed through a federal
unemployment tax59 on employers of 3.4% of each employee's
wages,6" up to $6,000 per annum. 1 An employer, however, is al-
lowed a credit of 90% of the amount of taxes paid under an ap-
proved state unemployment system, up to a maximum of 2.7%.62
State unemployment tax structures generally provide for experi-
ence rating and allow reduction of unemployment tax rates of em-
ployers with histories of low unemployment.6 The federal unem-
ployment tax includes additional credits for employers whose state
unemployment tax rate has been improved due to good experi-
imprisonment of up to one year or a fine of not more than $1,000 or both. A corporation or
company is subject to a fine of $1,000 per day for each day it is in violation. Id.
57. Id. § 445.606.
58. [1977] 1 B UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 1 1020.
59. This tax is imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-10
(1976).
60. Id. § 3301.
61. Id. § 3306(b)(1).
62. Id. § 3302(a)(b). See generally id. § 3304 and 20 C.F.R. § 601.1-5 (1979) on ap-
proval of state unemployment laws by the Secretary of Labor. The unemployment compen-
sation laws of every state and of the District of Columbia have been approved.
63. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.25(b)(2)(c) (Page 1973), which bases the
contribution rate on the balance in the employer's unemployment account with the state.
For 1980, 12 states allow employers with extremely good unemployment experience to pay
no tax. [1980] 1B UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) T 3000.
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ence. 4 The revenues produced by state unemployment taxes are
deposited in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund and credited
to the particular state's account. These funds are then withdrawn
by states to pay unemployment claims.65
Unemployment compensation laws are laws of general applica-
tion and benefits are not limited to employees out of work due to a
dislocation. If, however, a dislocation is the cause of the unemploy-
ment, the employee will receive unemployment benefits on the
same terms as any other claimant. This means that the* employee
will have to meet the eligibility requirements imposed by the stat-
ute. These requirements usually include being unemployed, filing a
claim for benefits, meeting a waiting period requirement,"6 being
able and available for work and seeking work. 7 Benefits may also
be limited to those who have been employed for a specified period
of time, earned a minimum amount of wages, or both.6 8 In addi-
tion, to avoid disqualification for benefits, a claimant usually must
accept a suitable offer of work. 9
If the employee is entitled to unemployment compensation
benefits, he or she will receive a modest benefit for a limited num-
ber of weeks, usually up to a maximum of twenty-six.70 The bene-
fits under unemployment compensation laws are by no means
64. 26 U.S.C. § 3303 (1976).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1104 (1976).
66. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(A)(2)(Page 1979 Supp.), which requires
the filing of a claim for benefits and a one-week waiting period. Retroactive payment is
made for this week if an individual has three consecutive compensable weeks of unemploy-
ment. Id. As of July, 1979, forty-one states required a waiting period. [1979] 1B UNEMPL.
INS. REP. (CCH) 1 3001.
67. See, e.g., OHIO REV, CODE ANN. § 4141.29(A)(4)(a) (Page 1979 Supp.) and MICH.
COMP. LAws § 421.28 (1970), which are typical provisions.
68. See [1974] 1B UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 1 3001 for a listing of the minimum wage
and time-employed requirements for each state.
69. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4141.29(D)(2)(b) (Page 1979 Supp.), which de-
nies benefits to an unemployed person who refuses an offer of suitable work without good
cause.
70. See [1979] lB. UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 3001 for a listing of benefit weeks for
each state. An individual who exhausts his benefits may also be entitled to benefits under
the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-373, title
II, 84 Stat. 708 (1970), as amended, including Pub. L. 94-566, title I, § 116(d)(1)(2), title II,
§ 212(a), title III, § 311(a)(b), 90 Stat. 2667, 2672, 2677, 2678 (1976). This Act provides up to
an additional 13 weeks of benefits, but not to exceed a total of 39 weeks when combined
with regular benefits, when unemployment reaches certain minimum levels at either the
state or national level. Id. 20 C.F.R. §§ 615.1-.15 (1979). Extended benefits are currently
available in four states and Puerto Rico for employees who have exhausted regular benefits.
Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1979, at 4, col.. 1.
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princely,71 are generally charged to the employer's account,7 2 and
may raise the employer's unemployment tax rate. However, this is
not necessarily the case. One author has stated that:
Because the . . . tax is not perfectly experience rated,
many lay-offs result in no increase, present or future, in an
employer's tax rate. Even if he is charged for the lay-off
...experience-rating plans are constructed so that it is
several years before his tax rises to reflect fully the cost of
a particular lay-off.73
In addition, the employer could already be at the maximum tax
rate, making an increase in the rate by definition impossible.
A dislocated employee may be entitled and even required to
avail himself of the services of a state employment services agency.
The Wagner-Peyser Act 74 created the United States Employment
Service (USES) within the Department of Labor. Its purpose is to
"promote the establishment and maintenance of a national system
of public employment offices."'7 5 Among other duties, these offices
engage in counseling and placing unemployed individuals."6 The
Act encourages states to establish employment service offices by
authorizing appropriations of money for payment to states which
have an unemployment compensation law approved by the Secre-
tary of Labor under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and
which are in compliance with the requirements of the Wagner-Pey-
ser Act.77 These requirements include designation or creation of a
71. See [1979] 1B UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) T 3001 for the minimum and maximum
amounts of weekly allowed benefits. For 1979, 14 states had maximum benefit rates of under
$100 per week for claimants with no dependents. Id. In no state does the maximum benefit
rate for any claimant reach $200 per week. Id. These benfits are, however, not subject to
income tax except in the case of some relatively high income taxpayers. I.R.C. § 85 (1979).
In a few industries, such as the steel, auto and rubber industries, an unemployed individual
may be entitled to supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) under a plan negotiated
between the employer and a union. The benefits combine with state unemployment com-
pensation to provide the worker with a given percentage of his former pay. For example, ti!,
United Rubber Workers plan provides 80% of former base gross pay and the United Auto
Workers plan provides 95% of former base take-home pay. Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1980, at 1,
col. 1.
72. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.24(D)(1) (Page 1979 Supp.) (employer's ac-
count charged for benefits based on the remuneration paid by him).
73. D. HAMERMESH, JOBLESS PAY AND THE ECONoMY 67 (1977).
74. Wagner-Peyser National Employment Systems Act, June 6, 1933, ch. 49, 48 Stat.
113, currently codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 49 et seq. (1976).
75. Id. § 49.
76. Id. § 49(b); 20 C.F.R. § 602.2-3 (1979).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 49(d) (1976).
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state agency to cooperate with the USES 78 and submission to the
USES of a plan for carrying out the provisions of the Act within
that state.7 9 The money paid to the states pursuant to this ar-
rangement is for use in administering the states' public employ-
ment offices.80 Many states have availed themselves of the benefits
of the Wagner-Peyser Act"1 and many dislocated workers have
found employment as a result.8 2
Overall, there is little disagreement with the proposition that
unemployment compensation and employment services systems
are necessary and desirable. While there is disagreement as to ex-
actly how such systems should be structured, few would argue for a
wholesale dismantling of them. Although unemployment compen-
sation only replaces a portion of an employee's lost wages, almost
$17 billion in benefits were paid in 1975.3
IV. FEDERAL STATUTES PERTAINING TO BUSINESS DISLOCATIONS
There are three points at which federal law comes into play
with respect to business dislocations. The first is the federal role in
the unemployment compensation and employment services areas,
both of which have already been mentioned. The second is the
Trade Act of 1974.84 Among other things, the Act provides relief
from injury to workers, firms and communities caused by foreign
import competition.85 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
has viewed the Trade Act as:
[A] comprehensive program to foster economic growth and
full employment in the United States and to strengthen
economic relations with foreign countries by reducing re-
strictions on foreign trade and imports. Because the Con-
gress recognized that increased importation of foreign
78. Id. 8 49(c).
79. Id. 8 49(g); 20 C.F.R. § 602.20 (1979).
80. 29 U.S C. § 49(d) (1976); 20 C.F.R. § 602.22 (1979).
81. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.04 (Page 1973), establishing an employment
services division of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services. The section is expressly in-
tended to enable Ohio to obtain the benefits of the Wagner-Peyser Act.
82. In 1973, approximately 4.9 million non-agricultural placements were made nation-
ally. Kolberg, Employment Security Programs and The Economy, 25 LAB. L. J. 659, 660
(1974).
83. D. HAMERMESH, supra note 73, at 1.
84. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq. (1976).
85. Id. §§ 2251-394. Subchapter II of the Act contains the provisions for relief from
injury caused by import competition. Id.
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goods could cause serious economic dislocations in certain
segments of American Society and because it wished to
ameliorate the consequences of such dislocations, it estab-
lished a series of remedial programs to assist affected
groups in adjusting to the effects of increased imports.86
With respect to adversely affected workers, once the appropri-
ate certification of eligibility has been made by the Secretary of
Labor, 7 workers are entitled to apply for a myriad of benefits.
Those workers who have been found to be totally or partially sepa-
rated from their employment because of increased foreign imports
are eligible for trade adjustment allowances,s8 employment ser-
vices,89 training (including supplemental assistance for expenses
when the training facilities are not within commuting distance of
the worker's regular place of residence),90 job search allowances 1
and relocation allowances.9 2
Business firms adversely affected by increased foreign imports
are also eligible for assistance.9 The most important aid available
is financial and may be in the form of either direct loans or loan
86. Usery v. Whitin Machine Works, Inc., 554 F.2d 498, 500 (1st Cir. 1977).
87. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271-74 (1976), 29 C.F.R. § 90 (1979), and Cprek, Worker Adjust-
ment Assistance: Black Comedy in the Post-Renaissance, 11 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L. Bus.
593, 609-678 (1979), which deal with the process of criteria for certification.
88. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2291-92 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 91.6-.14 (1979). The trade adjustment
allowance is 70% of the worker's average weekly wage, not in excess of the average weekly
manufacturing wage, minus 50% of the amount of remuneration earned for the week. 19
U.S.C. § 2292(a) (1976). The assistance may be paid for up to 52 weeks, with an additional
26 weeks permissible to enable an employee to complete an approved training program. Id.
§ 2293(a). There is a reduction of the assistance payable for any week by the amount of
unemployment compensation benefits a worker has received or would have received if he
had applied for that week. Id. § 2292(c). There is also an overall limit on the assistance
payable of 80% of the worker's average weekly wage. Thus, if an individual receives for any
week a combination of remuneration for services rendered, unemployment insurance bene-
fits, training assistance allowance and trade readjustment allowance exceeding 80% of his
average weekly wage, the trade adjustment allowance will be decreased in an amount equal
to the excess. Id. § 2292(e).
89. Id. § 2295. This would include, among other things, testing, counseling and job
referral. Id. See 29 C.F.R. § 91.17 (1979).
90. 19 U.S.C. § 2296 (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 91.17-.24 (1979).
91. 19 U.S.C. § 2297 (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 91.40-.47 (1979). Job search allowances of
80% of expenses up to $500 may be provided to workers who cannot reasonably be expected
to find suitable employment in the local commuting area. Id.
92. 19 U.S.C. § 2298 (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 91.28-.36 (1979). A relocation allowance of
80% of reasonable expenses, with no dollar limit, plus a lump sum of three times the
worker's average weekly wage up to a maximum of $500 is authorized of the worker cannot
be reasonably expected to find suitable employment in the local commuting area. Id.
93. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2341-54 (1976).
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guarantees. 4 Prerequisites must be met for the granting of assis-
tance, such as a requirement that the funds needed be unavailable
from the firm's own resources and that there be a reasonable assur-
ance of repayment.9 5 No loan made or guaranteed may have a ma-
turity date of more than twenty-five years96 and no loan guarantee
may be for more than ninety percent of the outstanding balance.
97
No firm may receive direct loans which at any time aggregate more
than $1 million or guaranteed loans which at any time aggregate
more than $3 million.9 8 Priority for assistance is given to firms
within the "small firms" meaning of the Small Business Act.99
Communities are also eligible for adjustment assistance if a
significant number of workers in the area are adversely affected by
increased foreign imports. 100 Aid provided may take the form of
loan guarantees to private lending institutions which loan money
to private borrowers within the affected area.10 1 Between corpora-
tions, preference is given to that corporation with an employee
stock ownership plan meeting certain criteria.
10 2
Finally, the Act includes a section stating that at least sixty
days prior to moving productive facilities to a foreign country, a
firm should give notice to the affected employees and to the Secre-
taries of Labor and Commerce.10 3 It also recites that it is "the
sense of the Congress" that such a firm should apply for and use
the assistance available under the Act and offer employment op-
portunities in the United States, along with relocation assistance,
to affected employees. 10 4
Several aspects of. this Act are interesting. The first is the
broad range of types of assistance and potential recipients, includ-
ing the potentially dislocating employer. The second is the narrow
scope of application of the Act. If the dislocation is not due to in-
creased foreign imports, then the Act is inapplicable. Third, bene-
fits provided under the Act are not funded by the dislocating em-
94. Id. § 2344.
95. Id. § 2345(a).
96. Id. § 2345(c).
97. Id. § 2345(e).
98. Id. § 2345(h).
99. Id. § 2345(d).
100. Id. § 2371(c). See generally id. §§ 2371-74.
101. Id. § 2373(d).
102. Id. § 2373(f).
103. Id. § 2394(a).
104. Id. § 2394(b).
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ployer. This is probably consistent with the philosophy of the Act,
which is to remedy the effects of increased foreign imports due to
the Trade Act of 1974. Presumably the employer is viewed as es-
sentially faultless and, therefore, is not made responsible for the
costs of adjustment assistance under the Act. Fourth, while provid-
ing for advance notice of certain transfers of operations, the notice
appears to be at best a moral and not a legal requirement. No pen-
alty provisions are included.
A third area where existing federal law may come into play is
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). °5 This is one
aspect of business dislocations which has received substantial at-
tention. For that reason, it will be dealt with here in summary
fashion.
If an employer closes all or part of a business concern or relo-
cates it, an employee or union might argue that such action consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice. The argument would be that by en-
gaging in the dislocating activity the employer had either
interfered with his employees' rights to engage in concerted activi-
ties'0 6 or had discriminated with respect to the terms or conditions
of employement in order to discourage union membership. 107 Cer-
tain basic rules clearly apply here. First of all, an employer has an
absolute right to terminate operations completely. This is true
whether or not the motive is anti-union animus. An economic justi-
fication need not exist. The United States Supreme Court held in
Textile Workers v. Darlington°8 that the NLRA does not require
one to remain an employer. The rule is somewhat different, how-
ever, with respect to a partial closing or a relocation. The Court
stated that a partial closing is an unfair labor practice if "moti-
vated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants
of the ... employer and if the employer may reasonably have
foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect."' 09 Simi-
larly, the relocation of a plant or its work to a new location in an
attempt to discourage union activity would constitute an unfair la-
105. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1976).
106. This would be a violation of § 8(a)(1) of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act. Id. [hereinafter N.L.R.A.]. Employees are given the right to engage in
concerted activity by § 7 of the N.L.R.A.. Id. § 157.
107. Id. This would be a violation of § 8(a)(3) of the N.L.R.A., § 158(a)(3).
108. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
109. Id. at 275.
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bor practice. This is the so-called "run-away shop" situation.110
Conversely, if the partial closing or relocation is a result of eco-
nomic and not anti-union motivations, the action would not be an
unfair labor practice."1
In addition to the question whether a dislocation in and of it-
self constitutes an unfair labor practice, a question may also arise
as to the employer's duty to bargain. 2 Although the Supreme
Court did not expressly address the issue, it has been accepted
since Darlington15 that an employer need not bargain about a de-
cision to terminate operations completely. There is disagreement
as to whether an employer must bargain over a partial closing or a
plant removal, at least absent anti-union animus." 4 Apart from
any duty to bargain over the actual decision, the employer will be
required to bargain over the effects of a partial closing or plant
removal.1 5 Probably the most important point here is that the em-
110. See, e.g., NLRB v. Winchester Electronics, 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961), wherein
the court rejected the employer's contention that the simultaneous commencement of lay-
offs at one plant and the opening of another plant resulted from labor shortages and trans-
portation difficulties at the first plant, and held instead that the employer's actions were
motivated by a desire to eliminate a union. Id. at 291-92. The court therefore upheld the
determination by the National Labor Relations Board that such action constituted an unfair
labor practice. Id. at 292.
111. See, e.g., Kipbea Baking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. No. 56 at 411 (1961) (relocation was
not an unfair labor practice where made for business reasons and not for the purpose of
encouraging or discouraging union activity).
112. This duty arises from § 8(a)(5) and (d) of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (d) (1976).
Together these provisions place an obligation on the employer to bargain in good faith with
the representatives of his employees with respect to wages, hours and other terms and con-
ditions of employment, and make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to do
so. With respect to matters other than wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment, each party is free to bargain or not to bargain. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
113. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
114. Compare, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in Brockway Motor Trucks v.
NLRB, 582 F. 2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978). The majority stated that "there is an initial presump-
tion. . . that a partial closing is a mandatory subject of bargaining." Id. at 735. The major-
ity believed that the interests of the parties should be balanced and that the duty to bargain
would not arise if severe economic necessity would tender any bargaining pointless. Id. at
731-34. The dissent argued that, absent anti-union animus, a partial closing is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. at 747. (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
115. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961), wherein
the court stated,
[t]he decision to move was not a required subject of collective bargaining ....
However, once that decision was made, § 8(a)(5) requires that notice of it be given
to the union so that the negotiators could then consider the treatment due to those
employees whose conditions of employment would be radically changed by the
move.
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ployer need not agree to any proposal or make any concession.118
All that need be done is to bargain in good faith to an impasse. 117
After so doing, an employer may unilaterally take action.
The fourth point at which federal law may apply is Title IV of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.118 The pro-
visions of Title IV would only be applicable if the dislocation were
accompanied by the termination of one or more qualified pension
plans. Title IV establishes the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion (PBGC) within the Department of Labor.1"9 A pension plan
covered by Title IV may not be terminated without the approval of
the PBGC.120 That approval is only given if the PBGC determines
that the assets of the plan are sufficient to pay all basic benefits 21
under the pension plan. If the assets of the plan are insufficient to
meet these obligations, the PBGC will guarantee benefits of up to
seven hundred fifty dollars per month, adjusted annually. 22 The
PBGC can recover from an employer that maintained a pension
plan which has been terminated the lesser of the current value of
the benefits guaranteed under the Act less the plan's assets on the
date of termination, or thirty percent of the net worth of the em-
ployer. 2 ' Finally, Title IV requires the PBGC to provide insurance
to employers who maintain or contribute to a pension plan covered
by pension benefit guarantees.12 4 This insurance protects an em-
ployer from liability in the event of a plan termination, with the
employer being required to pay premiums and be insured for over
sixty months before benefits would be payable. 25 The wisdom of
this Contingent Employer Liability Insurance has been questioned.
In Cooper Thermometer Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 684, 688 (2d Cir. 1967) the court, expanding
the Rapid Bindery decision, held that the employer had a duty not only to bargain on the
terms of the shutdown but also to bargain on the issue of transfer to the new plant.
116. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
117. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dell, 283 F.2d 733, 740 (5th Cir. 1960) (employer's refusal to
bargain was an unfair labor practice inasmuch as negotiations had not reached an impasse);
U.S. Cold Storage Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1108-09 (1951). The board stated that "the duty to
meet of course does not mean that parties must engage in futile bargaining in the fact of a
genuine impasse." Id.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1976).
119. Id. § 1302(a).
120. Id. § 1341.
121. Basic benefits are defined by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Program (PBGC) as
benefits guaranteed by Title IV. Id. §§ 1301(a)(6), and 1322(a).
122. Id. § 1322(a)-(b)(3).
123. Id. § 1362(b).
124. Id. § 1323(a).
125. Id. § 1323(d).
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One argument made is that the existence of the insurance will al-
low an employer to terminate a plan without liability and, there-
fore, will in effect encourage plan terminations. 12
If a dislocation, then, were to be accompanied by the termina-
tion of a plan covered by Title IV, the employer could be faced
with a substantial immediate liability which could range up to
thirty percent of the net worth of the business. This potential lia-
bility could conceivably motivate an employer to attempt to avoid
the dislocation, and ultimately operate to save jobs.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO BusINEss DISLOCATIONS
A number of bills have been proposed both at the federal and
state levels to deal with the business dislocation situation.127 The
focus here will be on several bills which have been proposed in cur-
rent and past sessions of the Ohio legislature and the United
States Congress. The general approaches taken in the Ohio and
federal bills can be expected to be similar to proposed bills in other
states, and comments made with respect to these bills should be
equally pertinent to similar bills in other jurisdictions.
The most basic type of proposed legislation merely requires
advance notice of business closings and relocations. An example of
such a bill, proposed in the federal Congress, was H.R. 579.128 It
would have required any person acquiring a business facility in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce to give actual notice to
employees and notice by publication to the community at least one
year and 180 days prior to closing or relocating the business. The
notice would have had to include an explanation of the reasons for
the action. 129 In addition, the owner of a business facility in or af-
fecting interstate or foreign commerce which had been in operation
for ten years or more and employed 200 or more persons would
have had to give actual notice to employees and constructive notice
126. Lind, Alternatives to CELL: Strengthening and Preserving the U.S. Private Pen-
sion System, 29 LAB. L.J. 747 (1978). In addition, Lind argues that allowing an employer to
insure its liability "would be an open invitation to raise benefits and shortlythereafter ter-
minate the plan, thereby leaving the pension system, through PBGC premiums, to foot the
bill." Id. at 749.
127. Bus. WK., June 25, 1979, at 32 cites Michigan, Ohio, Massachusetts, Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania as states with bills under consideration and Illinois and New Jersey as
states with bills about to be introduced. INDUS. WK., July 9, 1979, at 27 adds Connecticut
and California as having legislation introduced or being prepared.
128. H.R. 579, 95th Cong., lst Sess. (1977).
129. Id. § 1.
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by publication to the community at least 180 days prior to a clos-
ing. The notice, again, would have had to include an explanation of
the reasons for the action.13 0 A person aggrieved by a violation of
the proposed act would have been entitled to bring a civil action. 1' 3
Presumably this would have included not only employees, but also
suppliers, lenders, subcontractors and others. It would seem that if
relief had been intended only for employees, it would have been
simple enough to substitute the word "employee" in the place of
the term "any person." In addition, the bill contained a criminal
penality for a willful and knowing violation.13 2
Passage of this bill would have meant that a person acquiring
a covered business facility could not have closed or relocated s for
almost one and one-half years. The effect would most likely have
been to discourage the purchase of an existing business facility,
and instead would have placed an incentive on beginning a new
facility which would not have been covered for a period of ten
years. 3 4 Many existing businesses might in fact have become un-
marketable. 35 Facilities which had been in operation for ten or
more years and employed 200 or more employees would have been
subject to a shorter advance notice requirement. On the other
hand, the local community and employees would still have had, in
essence, a headlock on a covered business facility for almost one-
half year. The business could not have closed or relocated sooner,
no matter how compelling the reason, without having been subject
130. Id. § 2.
131. Id. § 3.
132. Id. § 4. A violator would have been subject to a $5,000 fine, imprisonment for one
year, or both.
133. One problem with the bill was that the terms "close" and "relocate" were not
defined. This left open the questions of whether a partial closing, a lay-off of short duration,
and a relocation of minimal distance, e.g., one-quarter of a mile, were covered. Arguably, the
language of the bill was broad enough to cover the lay-off and relocation at a minimal
distance.
134. H.R. 579, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1977).
135. This would be due in part to the fact that there is no minimum size necessary for
coverage of a business acquisition, it only being necessary that the business be in or affect-
ing interstate or foreign commerce. If the "affecting interstate commerce" factor were given
as broad an interpretation here as it has in other areas of federal law, the reach of the
provision would be quite broad. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), upholding application of Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1976), to wholly intrastate
commerce. In Heart of Atlanta the Civil Rights Act was successfully applied to soliciting
and accommodating interstate travelers and in Katzenbach to offering to serve interstate
travelers and purchasing goods which had moved in interstate commerce.
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to civil suit and criminal penalty.
An alternative to requiring advance notice. of dislocation is to
provide benefits to employees who are adversely affected by a dis-
location. Ohio H.B. No. 594136 is a bill which merely provides an
additional thirteen weeks of unemployment compensation pay-
ments to certain dislocated employees. It would apply to employers
who employed at least 500 persons at any establishment at any
time in the preceding two years. The bill would provide additional
benefits to employees when 1) the employer has totally closed any
establishment for at least one year, 2) the Administrator of the
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services determines that the closing
has resulted in a situation where the local labor market cannot
readily absorb the employees out of work as a result of the closing,
and 3) the employees have no remaining entitlement to regular un-
employment benefits. The ltnefits paid are chargeable to the ac-
count of the employer.137 Thnumerical trigger for the application
of this bill is rather high and coverage of employers rather narrow.
In addition, partial closings or partial relocations are not covered.
While the bill may have been well intended, its very narrow
application would seem to create a favored class of unemployed
individuals. The simple fact is that in a large labor market, such as
Cleveland, the market would probably be able to absorb 500 unem-
ployed individuals, barring special circumstances such as a depres-
sion or a closing of a highly specialized business. On the other
hand, a closing of a business with fifty employees in Limerick,
Ohio, may find the local labor market totally unable to absorb the
unemployed individuals. If inability of the local labor market to
absorb the unemployed is the trigger to entitlement to the addi-
tional benefits, then a much lower numerical standard of coverage,
such as twenty to fifty employees, should be used. The fortuitous
circumstance that one was employed by a very large employer as
opposed to a moderately-sized or even relatively small employer
should not be the basis for the provision of benefits. Apart from
the high numerical threshold, however, tying eligibility for the ad-
136. 113th Ohio Gen. Ass. (1979-80).
137. Ohio H.B. No. 594, 113th Gen. Ass. § 1 (1979-80). An amended Ohio H.B. No.
594 was passed by the Ohio House and Senate and sent to the Ohio governor, who vetoed it.
The amended bill was more generous than the bill as introduced, providing for waiver of
tuition and fees for affected persons for a period of up to 52 weeks at any public educational
institution. These educational benefits were to be for use in qualifying an affected individual
for new employment. Ohio AM. H.B. No. 594, 113th Gen. Ass. (1979-80).
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ditional benefits to the inability of the local labor market to absorb
the unemployed seems like a reasonable approach."8
Requiring advance notice of a planned dislocation and provid-
ing benefits to an employee who is adversely affected by a disloca-
tion need not, of course, be mutually exclusive. Several proposed
bills would, in fact, do both. One example is the proposed Commu-
nity Readjustment Act of 1979 which has been introduced into the
Ohio legislature.139
The bill is fairly straightforward. It provides that the owner of
an establishment which employs more than 100 persons would,
upon deciding to close,140 relocate,1 41 or reduce operations, 142 be
subject to certain requirements. First, there would be a require-
ment of giving written notice to a number of parties at least two
138. There is a companion bill to this one, Ohio H.B. No. 593, 113th Gen. Ass. (1979-
80). It would require the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services and private employment
agencies to cooperate in finding jobs for employees affected by major business closings. It
applies only to a total and permanent closing for a period of at least one year of a single
business facility employing at least 500 persons, not including a work site never intended to
be permanent. The bill does not require a finding that the unemployed workers cannot be
readily absorbed into the local labor market. The bill provides that the Bureau and private
agencies in the city or county in which the business facility is located shall share all infor-
mation regarding job opportunities which may be suitable for affected employees. Failure of
an employment agency to comply with the obligations the bill proposes would be grounds
for revocation of the agency's license. Id. § 1.
139. Ohio S.B. No. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. (1979-80). The bill is basically a reintroduc-
tion of Ohio S.B. No. 337, 112th Gen. Ass. (1977-78). Both were sponsored by State Senator
Michael Schwarzalder. One reason justifying focusing on the Ohio bill is the substantial
amount of attention it has generated, including an editorial in the Wall Street Journal, Dec.
7, 1978, at 20, cols. 1-2. The bill has also been recently introduced into the Ohio House with
13 co-sponsors. Ohio H.B. No. 968, 113th Gen. Ass. (1979-80). It was apparently introduced
there due to the difficulty backers of the bill in the Ohio Senate were having in getting the
bill out of committee and onto the floor.
140. Defined as "permanent shutting down of operations at any establishment other
than because the employer has filed for bankruptcy in accordance with federal bankruptcy
laws." Ohio S.B. No. 118, 113th Gen. Ass. § 1 (1979-80). Apparently the bill is not intended
to cover the lay-off or temporary shutdown situation. On the other hand, what does perma-
nent mean? A temporary shutdown can later become permanent. What happens then? Is
this a gap in the bill's coverage?
141. Id. Relocation is defined as a "transfer of a part of an employer's operation...
to another existing or proposed establishment located at an unreasonable distance, as deter-
mined by rule ... and which results in at least a 10% reduction in the number of employ-
ees at the establishment," but it doei not include transfers within a political subdivision. Id.
The statute does not expressly require a permanent transfer of operations and therefore
could be argued to cover a temporary "contracting out" situation. Id.
142. Id. Reduced operations is defined as a "permanent shutting down of a portion of
the operations at any establishment so as to reduce the number of employees employed at
that establishment by at least 50% over any two-year period." Id.
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years in advance of the proposed action. Further, the bill mandates
that businesses to which the bill applies must provide a written
economic impact statement with information regarding payroll,
number of employees affected by the dislocation, the wages of such
employees, amount of lost state and local tax revenue and the
financial effect of the dislocation on community businesses.143
Another requirement would be the making of a lump-sum pay-
ment to each employee losing his job, equal to the average weekly
wage of the employee times the number of years that employee has
been employed by the dislocating employer, along with payment
into a county Community Readjustment Fund equal to ten percent
of the total annual wages of all employees who have lost their
jobs.14 4 The employer would also be compelled to continue the
health insurance of affected employees for six months .or until an
employee finds other full-time work, 4 5 and to offer the employee
suitable employment at any other facility owned by the employer
if that facility is hiring, paying the employee's reasonable reloca-
tion expenses.'46 The employee would not be required to accept
such employment under the bill,' 47 but if accepted, the employer
need not pay that employee's severance benefits."48
The money paid into a Community Readjustment Fund could
be used for a variety of purposes, with priority given to providing
jobs for affected employees. Interestingly, the funds would be au-
thorized to grant money to a political subdivision for emergency
tax relief where the dislocation had caused a substantial loss of tax
receipts. 49
One view of the philosophy behind this bill is:
[t]o tax industries for certain uninsurable costs they im-
143. Id. The two-year notice may be dispensed with if it is determined that circum-
stances beyond the control of the employer make such notification impossible. Id.
144. Id. It is expressly provided in the bill that acceptance of the severance payment
by the employee shall not result in denial of unemployment compensation benefits under
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.01 et seq. (Page 1973), nor shall it affect seniority or recall
rights of the employee with the dislocating employer. Ohio S.B. No. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. § 1
(1979-80).
145. Ohio S.B. No. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. § 1 (1979-80). This was not required by the
predecessor bill, Ohio S. B. No. 337, 112th Gen. Ass. (1977-78).
146. Ohio S.B. No. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. § 1 (1979-80).
147. However, there might still be an issue of refusal of suitable work for purposes of
unemployment compensation benefits. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4141.29(d)(2)(b) & (e)(3)
(Page 1978 Supp.).
148. Ohio S.B. No. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. § 1 (1979-80).
149. Id.
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pose on communities .... A sudden, once and for all, ir-
reversible shutdown of a large plant is a social cost not
shared by the private enterprise which makes the deci-
sion .... It is not the sort of event that an insurance
company would find feasible to insure against .... So,
ideally, we would like the legislation to bend business de-
cisions slightly in a direction which otherwise they would
not take. . . . In other words, it will raise the costs of relo-
cation or shifts of production elsewhere. 150
This bill proposes strong medicine. The proponents of the bill,
perhaps justifiably concerned about the impact of business disloca-
tions on employees, local tax revenues and the business community
as a whole, are attempting to enact legislation which would, as a
practical matter, make hostages of local businesses. 151 Dislocations
within the scope of the bill could become so costly and burden-
some that business decisions would virtually always be to act so as
to avoid the dislocation. 52 The effect of this, one must believe,
would be passage of similar legislation in other states and contin-
ual amendment of the legislation to tighten the headlock on local
business. The result of such an internecine competition would be
business stagnation, with businesses often being unable to relocate
or close even an unprofitable facility.
A federal bill similar to this was the proposed National Em-
ployment Priorities Act of 1976.151 It would have amended the Fair
150. Written testimony of Peter Bearse, Ph.D., Woodrow Wilson School of Public In-
ternational Affairs, Princeton University, regarding Ohio S.B. No. 337, 112th Gen. Ass.
(1977-78), dated February 8, 1978.
151. If an employer chooses to simply ignore the requirements of the bill, the em-
ployer would be subject to a civil suit by any employee, resident of the community, or em-
ployee organization or representative. If a court found the employer intentionally failed to
give the required notice, the court could enjoin the closing, relocation or reduction of opera-
tions. Ohio S.B. No. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. § 1 (1979-80).
152. Undated promotional material in the possession of the author prepared by the
Ohio Public Interest Campaign, an ardent supporter of the bill, in arguing that the costs
imposed would be minor, estimates that the cost to General Motors of benefits to employees
when it closed its Frigidaire Division in Dayton, eliminating 8,000 jobs, would have been
$36.4 million before and $19.7 million after taxes. For Goodyear closing its Akron plant the
estimates are $7.3 million and $3.9 million respectively. This estimate apparently does not
include the cost of required payment into the Community Readjustment Fund. Ohio S.B.
No. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. § 1 (1979-80).
153. H.R. 13100, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976). See also the National Employment
Standards Act of 1977, S. 1966, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which was essentially the same
bill as H.R. 13100.
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Labor Standards Act15 4 to require any business concern employing
at least fifty employees 1 5 to give written notice to the Secretary of
Labor and affected employees at least two years in advance 5" of
closing or transfering all or part of the operations of an establish-
ment of that concern.157 The notice would have had to include con-
siderable information such as the reasons for and alternatives to
the dislocation, the extent of potential employment loss caused by
the dislocation, plans to alleviate this unemployment, and detailed
economic data about the establishment involved and the larger
business concern, if one existed.158
Affected employees would have been entitled to file an appli-
cation for adjustment assistance with the Secretary of Labor, who
would have made a determination as to eligibility.'59 The adjust-
ment assistance could have taken many forms including, but not
limited to, income maintenance payments, maintenance of pension
and health benefits, job placement and retraining, relocation al-
lowances, early retirement benefits, emergency mortgage and rent
payments, and food stamps and surplus commodities for persons
below the poverty level. In addition, a dislocated employee, to the
extent practical, would have had to be offered suitable employ-
ment available at other establishments of a business. 6 '
The bill would have also authorized assistance to other parties
in the event of a dislocation. Assistance to local governmental units
to replace the substantial loss of revenue from payroll and real and
personal property taxes, to businesses in the community in the
form of loans or loan guarantees for the purpose of providing in-
154. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19. (1976).
155. H.R. 13100, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 2 (1976). In determining whether the statu-
tory 50 employee threshold had been met, parent corporations would have been considered
with all their subsidiaries. Id. This would have closed a potential loophole.
156. Id. The notice requirement would have been inapplicable if less than 15% of all
members of any labor organization or less than 15% of all employees at an establishment
suffered an "eligible employment loss," defined as being unemployed or receiving less than
85% of the pre-dislocation average weekly wage. Id. In addition, the Secretary of Labor
would have been able to approve notice given with "all reasonable promptness" if he found
that in good faith the business concern could not have predicted the dislocation two years in
advance. Id.
157. See note 155 supra. The definition of "transfer of operations" would have ex-
cluded those in which the new location was a reasonable commuting distance from the old.
Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. Only employees suffering an eligible employment loss would have been enti-
tled to adjustment assistance. See note 156 supra.
160. See note 155 supra.
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creased employment opportunities and to businesses faced with
dislocation would have been authorized.1 61
The bill had a very interesting section which would have with-
drawn benefits from businesses which engaged in unjustified dislo-
cations. If after an investigation the Secretary of Labor found that
a dislocation had not been justified, could have been avoided if the
business had accepted assistance under the bill's provision, had not
been preceded by filing of an advance notice as required, or was to
a new location outside the U.S. even though other suitable alterna-
tives existed, then the business would have lost a number of bene-
fits under the Internal Revenue Code 1 2 with respect to both the
old and new establishments.1 6 3
This bill is interesting in several respects. First, while the pro-
posed Ohio Community Readjustment Act 16 would provide for
employee benefits, to be paid by dislocating employers, the federal
bill would have provided benefits funded by appropriations from
general revenues. Thus, to the extent that one accepts the philoso-
phy that business dislocations generate "social costs" which should
be borne by the offending business enterprise, the bill was un-
sound. On the other hand, if one is convinced that a business en-
terprise may be run with profit maximization as a goal and that
the interests of employees, the community and local political sub-
divisions need not be considered in business decision making, the
bill adopted the appropriate approach. The costs generated are
then not viewed as the responsibility of the dislocating employer
and are treated as part of a general welfare program. Second, the
authors of the bill recognized that federal law currently not only
permits but also aids and perhaps encourages business disloca-
tions. The bill, therefore, attempts to prevent the Internal Reve-
161. Id. Two forms of aid to businesses faced with dislocation would have been
financial assistance, including loans and loan guarantees, and employee retraining. Certain
findings by the Secretary of Labor would have been necessary before such assistance could
have been extended. These would have included findings that the dislocation would cause a
substantial loss of employment, that dislocation would be economically justified and that
the assistance could reasonably be expected to enable the business to operate on an im-
proved financial basis and thereby avoid the dislocation. Id.
162. 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976).
163. H.R. 13100, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 2 (1976). These would have included the
investment credit under I.R.C. § 38, the accelerated depreciation range under I.R.C. §
167(m) and deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses under I.R.C. § 162(a) if those
expenses related to the unjustified dislocation. 26 U.S.C. §§ 38, 162(a), 167(m) (1976).
164. S.B. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. (1979-80).
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nue Code 1 5 from being utilized to subsidize what are deemed to be
unwarranted dislocations.166
A number of bills introduced into Congress would attempt to
avoid dislocations by promoting employee and employee-commu-
nity ownership of businesses which would otherwise be dislocated.
The Voluntary Job Preservation and Community Stabilization Act
(H.R. 2203) and the Voluntary Broadened Stock Ownership, Job
Preservation and Community Stabilization Act16 7 (S. 1058) would
both provide assistance to meet these goals.
In the United States Senate, S. 1058 would authorize the Eco-
nomic Development Administration (EDA), after a determination
by the Secretary of Commerce that the use of funds is within the
purposes of the Act, to provide guaranteed loans to employee or
employee-community organizations for start-up, operating costs,
and equity funding for the purchase of stock. 68 The bill would al-
low the EDA to use funds appropriated under the proposed Na-
tional Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1979,169
but would not appropriate additional funds.17 0 H.R. 2203, on the
other hand, would authorize additional appropriations of at least
$100 million per fiscal year for the fiscal year ending September
1980 with increased amounts for the six succeeding fiscal years.1 L7
The bill would authorize loans by the Secretary of Commerce to
the employee or employee-community group for start-up and oper-
ating costs connected with purchasing a concern, but the funds for
the actual purchase of the stock would be loaned directly to the
individual employees.1 72 The bill would require a written commit-
ment from an employee or employee-community organization to
act as the agent of the federal government in collecting loan and
interest repayments through payroll deductions before loans would
be made to employee members of the organization.17 3 Loans to in-
165. 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976).
166. H.R. 2203, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill is essentially a reintroduction of
H.R. 11222, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
167. S. 1058, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
168. Id. § 5.
169. S. 914, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The Senate passed this bill on August 1,
1979, and sent it to the House of Representatives. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2264
(1979).
170. S. 1958, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1979).
171. H.R. 2203, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1979).
172. Id. § 5.
173. Id. § 5 (c)(2)(C).
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dividual employees exceeding $15,000 in amount or ten years in
duration would be prohibited. In addition, forgiveness of loans
would be expressly prohibited. 174
A bill which would promote employee ownership of small busi-
nesses is the Small Business Employee Ownership Act.17 5 This bill
would make loan guarantees available under the Small Business
Administration's business loan program1 7 6 to enable employees to
purchase small business concerns which would otherwise be closed,
liquidated or relocated.1 7 The loans guaranteed could be made to
employee organizations, employee-owned business concerns and
business concerns' employee stock ownership plans (ESOP's) and
trusts (ESOT's).17 8 The principal amount of any loan guaranteed
could not exceed $500,000.179
The bill would permit a guarantee of up to ninety percent of
the total remaining payments at the time of default. Thus, the
Small Business Administration's obligations would not exceed
$450,000 on any guarantee. In addition, at least fifty-one percent of
the total stock or other asset value must be owned by at least fifty-
one percent of the employees of the concern after the assistance is
rendered. Finally, except with respect to ESOP's, there must be a
method whereby the loan to the employee organization can be re-
paid by employee members through payroll deductions if the
method of repayment used fails to produce the necessary cash.1 80
All of the bills establish certain prerequisites for the extension
of aid, with a number of these being aimed at assuring that the
business concern involved would be a viable concern after the
transfer of ownership to employees or the employee-community
group, 181 or would generate sufficient revenues to repay loans guar-
anteed. 18 2 In addition, a requirement for assistance under all the
bills is that all employees be offered an opportunity to participate
174. Id. § 5 (d).
175. S. 388, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); the same bill in the House of Representatives
is H.R. 3056, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). S. 388 has passed the Senate.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 636 (1976).
177. S. 388, 96th Cong., 1st Sass. § 5 (1979).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 5 (as amended). As introduced, the limit was $1 million. As introduced, H.R.
3056 had a $500,000 limit on loan guarantees. S. 388, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1979).
180. S. 388, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1979).
181. H.R. 2203, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(c)(2)(B) (1979); S. 1058, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 5(c)(2)(B) (1979).
182. S. 388, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1979).
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in the ownership plan, and to the extent practical, that provision
be made for the repurchase of stock owned by employees no longer
associated with the business.""3
In analyzing these bills, it should be noted that the Small Bus-
iness Employee Ownership Act 84 would not be very useful in
averting major dislocations. The bill is aimed at promoting em-
ployee ownership of small businesses and thus has correspondingly
low limits on the loan guarantee program proposed. A dislocation
could, however, be as traumatic to an employee of a small business
as it would to an employee of a large one. The economic effects on
the employee could also be the same. However, S. 1058185 and H.R.
2203186 would provide a major financing vehicle for employee own-
ership of businesses. On its face, this solution to the problem of
business dislocation appears to be most fair. Instead of requiring
the employer to keep its capital at risk for up to six months or two
years, or imposing a tax on employers who make a decision to dis-
locate, presumably for valid business reasons, the bills would en-
able employees to step in and place their capital at risk. By suc-
cessfully operating the business concern, employees can potentially
demonstrate that the contemplated dislocation was not the only
nor, perhaps, the best course of action.
At a deeper level, however, the bills pose serious questions. As-
suming that employers would consent-which is by no means cer-
tain-the wisdom of allowing it is not clear. Many dislocations are
valid business decisions. In order to avoid involving employees in
the ownership and operation of marginal or financially troubled
concerns, care must be exercised. Further, there is a potentially
broader objection to the proposed bills. Economist Peter Drucker
argues:
Investing the worker's main savings in the business that
employs him may be "industrial democracy," but it is
financial irresponsibility. The employee already has a big
stake in the company that employs him: his job. To put
the employee's financial future, his pension claim, into the
same basket violates all principals of sound investment. 8 7
183. See notes 181-82 & accompanying text supra.
184. S. 388, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
185. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
186. Id.
187. P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 8 (1976). Consider in this regard the posi-
tion of 16,700 salaried workers of Chrysler who participate in a thrift purchase plan owning
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Drucker further contends that using "employee pension money to
invest in the employing company would make sure that few em-
ployees would ever get a pension," and states that over half of all
businesses disappear altogether within a forty-year period.188 Thus,
a business which appears sound when purchased by employees
may go bankrupt ten or twenty years later. Although Drucker's
comments were directed at use of employee pension funds, they
would seem to apply equally well to any plan to have employees
invest a substantial part of their assets in an undiversified portfo-
lio-their employing company. Should unsuspecting workers be in-
duced to make, either directly or indirectly, a substantial invest-
ment in an operation in which businessmen may have already
decided there is no future? Will it be necessary to step in at a later
date and bail out a substantial number of these concerns in order
to protect employee expectations and prevent financial disaster for
groups of workers? Finally, if it is determined that it is inadvisable
to encourage employees to take these risks, then is it justifiable to
force unwilling employers to assume them?
Finally, the most recent bills introduced into Congress com-
bine all of the above approaches. An example is the National Em-
ployment Priorities Act of 1979.189 Briefly, business concerns hav-
ing an annual gross volume of sales of business of at least $250,000
would be covered by this bill. 190 The bill would require advance
notice of a change of operations 91 at an establishment which
would result in an employment loss 192 in any eighteen-month pe-
riod that "equals or exceeds the lesser of 100 employees or 15 per-
cent of the employees." '193 The notice would have to be given to the
Secretary of Labor, employees, labor unions, and units of local gov-
more than 15% of Chrysler's common stock. Bus. WK., Oct. 1, 1979, at 46-47. Would their
money be better invested elsewhere?
188. DRUCKER, supra note 187.
189. S. 1608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The same bill in the House is H.R. 5040,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also the Employee Protection and Community Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1979, S. 1609, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill takes the same general
approach as S. 1068, providing for advance notice, payment of benefits, and promotion of
employee and community ownership. It is, however, less punitive. See Cook, Labor Lines
Up on Plant-Closing Issue, INDUSTRY WK., Sept. 3, 1979, at 24.
190. S. 1608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(4) (1979).
191. Defined as a "transfer of any operation from an establishment or the termination
of any operation." Id. § 3(5).
192. Defined by the bill. Id. § 3(11).
193. Id. § 4(a).
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ernment and would have to include specified information. 194 The
advance notice period would vary from six months to two years,
depending on the number of employees suffering an employment
loss. 195
Adversely affected employees would be eligible for a number
of benefits and protections under the bill. These would include the
opportunity to transfer to other establishments owned by a busi-
ness concern,196 the right to income maintenance payments,1 97 the
right to continued employer contributions to employee benefits
plans,"19 and the right to continued employer contributions to pen-
sion plans for certain older workers to enable them to vest under
the plan.199 The employees may also be eligible for training, job
search expense payments, and moving expense payments provided
by the Secretary of Labor. °°
Business concerns intending to dislocate would be eligible for
assistance for the purpose of avoiding the dislocation. 201 The assis-
tance would be available in the form of "loans, loan guarantees,
interest subsidies, and the assumption of any outstanding debt.M02
Affected local governmental units would be eligible to receive
assistance in the form of loans and loan guarantees from the Secre-
tary of Labor.0 3 In addition, the bill would make dislocating busi-
nesses liable for the major portion of the community's loss in real
or personel property taxes due to the dislocation.0 4
The bill would authorize the Secretary of Labor to make loans
and loan guarantees for a number of purposes including the acqui-
sition of ownership of firms by employee associations.20 5
194. Id. § 4(b).
195. Id. § 4(b)(3)(A).
196. Id. § 11. The employer would also be required to pay the reasonable moving ex-
penses of an employee accepting a transfer. Id. § 9(b).
197. Id. § 9(a)(1)(A). Unlike some of the proposed bills, these payments would be re-
lated to actual income loss and would be reduced by the amount of any unemployment
compensation or trade readjustment allowance paid. Id. § 9(a)(4). In addition, employees
receiving a retirement benefit from a pension plan to which the employer has contributed
would not be entitled to any income maintenance payments. Id. § 9(a)(10).
198. Id. § 9(a)(1)(B).
199. Id. § 12(d).
200. Id. § 13.
201. Id. § 15.
202. Id. § 16(a)(1).
203. Id. §§ 18, 19.
204. Id. § 23.
205. Id. §§ 20, 21.
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Finally, the bill would provide substantial penalties for
violations. °6
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUES
The bills which have been proposed to deal with the problem
of business dislocations raise a number of potential constitutional
law issues. While these issues will not be discussed in great
depth-that is best left to constitutional law scholars-it is neces-
sary to highlight certain problem areas, and to make some modest
suggestions as to how some of these problems might be avoided.
A. Contract Clause
The contract clause of the United States Constitution207 has
recently gained substantial attention due to two Supreme Court
cases20 8 which have implemented the clause to invalidate state leg-
islation. This discussion will focus on the most recent of these two
cases, Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus.2 9 The statute under
consideration in that case was the Minnesota Private Pension Ben-
efits Protection Act.210 Under this law a private employer with one
hundred or more employees, at least one of whom resided in Min-
nesota, was liable for a pension refunding charge if it terminated a
qualified pension plan or closed a Minnesota office where the em-
ployees were covered by a qualified pension plan. The charge
would be sufficient to provide a full pension to all workers em-
ployed at any location within the state with ten or more years of
service, including service prior to the effective date of the act.211 In
addition, the Act required any employer covered by it to give the
Commissioner of Labor and Industry notice at least six months in
advance of a cessation of operation or termination of a pension
plan.212 The Act was passed on April 9, 1974,213 to become effective
206. Id. §§ 24-26.
207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
208. Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (contract clause used to
invalidate state pension legislation); U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (con-
tract clause used to invalidate legislation retroactively repealing statutory convenant for the
protection of bondholders).
209. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
210. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1980).
211. Id. §§ 181B.02-.03.
212. Id. § 181B.08.




Allied Structural Steel had over 100 employees, thirty of
whom were employed in Minnesota. Allied began to phase out its
Minnesota operations in the summer of 1974, releasing eleven of
its thirty employees and giving notice, as required, of its intent to
close its state office. The company had a pension plan providing
for vested pension benefits for employees age sixty-five regardless
of length of service, and for other designated employees with no
less than fifteen years of service. Nine of the eleven employees re-
leased had more than ten years of service with the company but
did not, under the plan, have vested pension rights. The commis-
sioner notified Allied that it was subject to a pension funding
charge of approximately $185,000. The company brought an action
to avoid the liability, arguing that the Act transgressed the con-
tract clause.215 After losing at the federal district court level,16 the
company appealed to the Supreme Court.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court conceded that
"the contract clause does not operate to obliterate the police power
of the states. 211  The Court made it clear, however, that the con-
tract clause does "impose some limits upon the power of a State to
abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of
its otherwise legitimate police power."218 In rev;ersing, the Court
relied heavily on Home Building & Loan Association v. Blais-
dell,2 9 a depression era contract clause case upholding a Minne-
sota mortgage moratorium law. The Court stated that several fac-
tors had been important in that case. These were the existence of
an emergency situtation, limitation of the statute to the duration
of the emergency, the reasonableness of the conditions imposed,
the careful tailoring of the statutory provisions to the emergency
and, finally, the fact that the statute was based on a broad social
problem and not simply designed to protect a favored few. 220
The Court believed the Minnesota statute under consideration
did not pass constitutional muster for several reasons. First, the
Act regulated an area which had not been regulated by the Minne-
214. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181B.17 (West Supp. 1980).
215. 438 U.S. at 236-40.
216. Fleck v. Spannaus, 421 F. Supp. 20 (D. Minn. 1976).
217. 438 U.S. at 241.
218. Id. at 242.
219. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
220. 438 U.S. at 242.
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sota legislature in the past and operated as a substantial impair-
ment of a contractual obligation in an area-the funding of a pen-
sion plan-where reliance on the terms of the contract is
important. Second, the changes it required the company to make
were retroactive and were immediately effective with no gradual
phase-in or grace period.221 In addition, the Court determined that
the law was not aimed at "broad and desperate economic condi-
tions" '222 as had been the case in Blaisdel,22s but instead was
aimed only at those employers who had "in the past been suffi-
ciently enlightened as voluntarily to agree to establish pension
plans.22 4
Several comments can be made here. First, this case, when
viewed in conjunction with United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey,12 5 indicates that the Supreme Court is at least willing to
consider a contract clause argument. Second, the case does offer
some guidance on drafting a bill to avoid contract clause problems.
One possibility would be to provide benefits payable out of general
revenues instead of the dislocating employer's pocket.2 6 A bill
drafted in this manner would not affect the rights as between the
parties. The problem here, of course, is a philosophical one. If the
social costs of a dislocation are viewed as the employer's dirty
linen, then an approach which provides reparations out of general
revenues is unacceptable. A second possibility is to draft a bill
which is prospective in operation or, at least, provides a modest
grace period before taking effect. A grace period would eliminate
the surprise element, which appeared to bother the majority in Al-
lied Structural Steel,2 7 and serve notice that at some definite
point in the future the employer would be held to the statutory
requirements. This would eliminate a reliance argument, since at
that point the employer would have no reasonable basis for not
taking the statutory requirements into account in making business
221. Id. at 246-50.
222. Id. at 249.
223. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
224. 438 U.S. at 250. The dissenters disagreed with the majority as to the seriousness
of the social problem addressed by the statute and the extent of the burden imposed on
employers. Id. at 252-55. They argued that the contract clause only invalidates state laws
which diminish and not those that increase the duties of a contractual obligor. Id. at 256-59.
225. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
226. See, e.g., the proposed National Employment Priorities Act of 1976, H.R. 13100,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
227. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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decisions. Finally, since the contract clause operates as a restric-
tion on states only, a bill introduced at the federal level would not
be subject to subsequent invalidation under the clause.
B. Equal Protection
A statute dealing with business dislocations could potentially
be subject to an equal protection attack under the fourteenth
amendment,228 under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment 229 or under a state constitution.23 0 A potential target under
an equal protection attack would be a numerical threshold for the
applicability of the statute. A number of the proposed bills include
numerical thresholds which would limit their applicability to larger
employers. 2 l Typical of the numerical threshold argument is the
Maine statute dealing with business dislocations.2 2 In Shapiro
Bros. Shoes v. Lewiston-Auburn S.P.A.,233 an earlier version of the
Maine statute was attacked on equal protection grounds, both
under the Maine and United States Constitutions. Not only the
numerical threshold, in this case 100 or more employees, but also
the exemption from coverage of businesses forced out of business
was challenged.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court described the require-
ments of the equal protection doctrine under both the Maine and
federal constitutions as:
Only invidious-arbitrary or unreasonable- discrimina-
tion is prohibited by law... . [T]he legislature may in its
wide discretion promulgate legislation which treats some
classes differently from others so long as the dissimilar
treatment is not arbitrary and is rationally related to the
objectives of the statute ...
[I]t is not necessary for the Legislature to remedy all
the evils in a given area when it passes a certain act....
228. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
229. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme
Court held that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
Id. at 499. Thus, the due process clause of the fifth amendment has been found to apply an
equal protection guarantee to classifications under federal law. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, CONsTrrioNAL LAW 383 (1978).
230. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2.
231. See, e.g., H.R. 579, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Ohio S.B. 188, 113th Gen. Ass.
(1979-80); H.R. 13100, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
232. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-A(1) (West Supp. 1979-80).
233. 320 A.2d 247 (Me. 1974).
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[M]ere imperfection in classifications in the area of eco-
nomics and social welfare does not lead to a constitutional
violation. 2 4
The Court upheld both the numerical and the voluntary-invol-
untary classifications, easily finding a justification or reasonable
basis for them. With respect to the numerical classification, the
Court believed that dislocations caused by the closing of a large
business would be greater than when a small employer closed. For
this reason the classification served the purpose of excluding from
coverage those businesses whose closing would cause minor or even
negligible dislocations.23 5 As to the voluntary-involuntary classifi-
cation, the Court opined that application of the statute's notice
and severance pay requirements to involuntary closings might be
unnecessarily harsh. The resulting unfairness of applying the Act
to businesses unable to avoid closing provided a rational basis for
the classification. 6
The Maine Court relied upon the rational basis analysis used
by the federal courts in most equal protection cases which turn on
the wisdom of economic legislation.23 One could attempt to fault
the conclusion as to the validity of the numerical threshold by
pointing out that the effect of a business closing is not totally or
even mainly determined by the size of the employer. Other factors,
such as the size of the local labor market, the current unemploy-
ment rate in that labor market and the skill level of dislocated em-
ployees affect the severity of the dislocation. The problem is that a
statutory threshold requirement could not presume to take all of
these factors into account and yet remain workable. Thus a statu-
tory threshold, which takes into account only one of a number of
determinants, would represent a legitimate legislative judgment.
In sum, one can be reasonably assured that any of the numer-
ous bills which have been proposed could, as written or with minor
changes, pass muster under a rational basis equal protection
234. Id. at 255-56.
235. Id. at 256.
236. Id.
237. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1969) (classifications need not be
perfect in the area of economics and social welfare, but rather need only be rationally
based); Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489-93 (1977). There
would be no constitutionally suspect classification in any of the proposed bills. Therefore,
the more demanding "strict scrutiny" standard, with its heavier burden of justification for a




C. The Taking Problem
The fifth amendment2 8s prohibits the taking of private prop-
erty for public use without just compensation. This provision is
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 3 In addition, similar requirements are found in many state
constitutions. " ° Cases in which actual physical possession of prop-
erty is taken fall clearly within the language of the prohibition.
Other types of cases have presented more difficult problems. It has
been determined, for example, that aircraft flights over property at
low altitudes may constitute a compensable "taking. ' 241 In addi-
tion, it has been held that statutes which go too far in regulating a
property owner's use of his land may constitute a "taking. '24 2
With respect to the proposed legislation, the advance notice
requirements in several of the bills 243 could be argued to constitute
a compensable "taking." Consider the situation of a business con-
cern which has suffered sizable losses for several years on a plant
in state X. If either Congress or the state legislature had passed a
statute requiring the concern to give two years advance notice
before closing, the effect would be to force the business to main-
tain its capital at risk for two years regardless of losses. Does this
constitute a compensable "taking" of an estate for years? Is the
concern entitled to a recovery for the use of its capital for two
years? There is substantial case law holding that an investor-
owned utility is entitled to earn a reasonable rate of return on its
investment. It has been held that the failure or refusal of a regula-
tory commission to permit such earnings amounts to a confiscation
238. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
239. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 122, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1979). See also Note, The Preservation of Land Marks
- or the Future of the Past is in the Future and in the Police Power, 8 CArrAL U.L. REv.
553 (1979).
240. See, e.g., OHIo CONST. art. I, § 19.
241. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, reh. denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
242. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also Arverne Bay
Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 287 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938) (zoning regulation went so far as
to constitute a "taking" prohibited by the constitutions of New York and the United
States). Nonetheless, a regulation which adversely affects property values is not necessarily
a "taking" if it is otherwise reasonable. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1979); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
243. See, e.g., H.R. 579, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1977).
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of property without due process of law.244 Thus it would appear
that an argument could be made that the two-year advance notice
requirement can operate, in the case of a concern which is not rea-
sonably profitable, in the same manner as confiscatory rates in the
case of a utility.
The Supreme Court addressed the taking problem concerning
business dislocations in Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n.
of Louisiana.245 The case involved a lumber company which also
operated a railroad in Louisiana. The Railroad Commission of
Louisiana ordered the company to operate the railroad. The com-
pany, desirous of abandoning the operation, claimed it would suf-
fer losses of more than $1,500 per month if it complied.4 6 In a
brief opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court held the company could
not be compelled to carry on even part of its business at a loss. 247
The Court analogized to the line of utility cases referred to above,
stating that "the principle is illustrated by the many cases in
which the constitutionality of a rate is shown to depend upon
whether it yields to the parties concerned a fair return.' ' 248 The
Court never clearly articulated the basis for its decision, yet did
cite an old due process ca249 in support of its conclusion.250
The Brooks-Scanlon decision was cited by a New York trial
court in a 1978 case. That case, People ex. rel. Lewis v. Safeco
Insurance Co.,251 involved an attempt by the New York Superin-
tendent of Insurance to obtain an injunction preventing two insur-
ance companies, both wholly owned subsidiaries of Safeco, from
244. See, e.g., Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. New York Tele. Co., 271 U.S. 23 (1926)
wherein the Court stated that: "The just compensation safeguarded to the utility by the
Fourteenth Amendment is a reasonable return on the value of the property used at the time
that it is being used for the public service. And rates not sufficient to yield that rate are
confiscatory." Id. at 31. See also Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1926), where the Court stated that the principle that
unreasonable and confiscatory rates deprive a public utility of its property in violation of
the fourteenth amendment was "so well settled by numerous decisions of this Court that
citation of the cases is scarcely necessary." Id. at 690.
245. 251 U.S. 396 (1920).
246. Id. at 397.
247. Id. at 399.
248. Id.
249. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). The case involved an Illinois statute regulat-
ing grain warehouses. The Court stated that while the fourteenth amendment prevents
states from depriving an owner of his property without due process of law, private property
affected with a public interest is subject to public regulation. Id. at 125-26.
250. 251 U.S. at 399.
251. 98 Misc. 2d 856, 414 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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surrendering their licenses to do business in New York and phas-
ing out their insurance business in the state. The reason for the
desire to withdraw from the state was $7 million in business losses
over approximately a three-year period. The defendant companies
proposed an orderly phase-out which would include honoring all
existing policies until the next expiration date.252 The court held
that although the police power gave the state the right to. regulate
the insurance industry, that power was not absolute. The court
noted that the insurance companies were protected both under the
United States and New York Constitutions by the prohibitions
against taking private property for public use without just compen-
sation and against depriving a person of property without due pro-
cess of law.258 The court concluded that the state could not "con-
script and compel them to continue doing business at a loss in
[the] State, 254 basing this conclusion on due process grounds.2 5 5 It
would appear that there is authority supporting the proposition
that a company cannot be compelled to do business at a loss and
has a right to discontinue unprofitable operations. If this is in fact
true, several questions then arise. First, can a concern be com-
pelled to do business at a reasonable profit? In Safeco, one cause
of the companies' losses apparently was a moratorium the New
York Superintendent of Insurance had imposed on rate increases
on certain policies.2 56 This action most likely made it impossible
for the companies to make a profit. Nonetheless, the court stated
that without "the most severe and grave public emergency, the
State may not compel a corporation to conduct a business against
its choosing. ' 257 In sum, the court might have allowed a forced con-
tinuation at a profit if faced with a true emergency situation, but
not otherwise.
A recent New Jersey case involved facts similar to those in
Safeco. In Sheeran v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,255 the
New Jersey Commissioner of Insurance brought an action in an
252. Id. at 858-59, 414 N.Y.S.2d4 at 824-25.
253. Id. at 864-65, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 827-28.
254. Id. at 866, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
255. Id. The court stated that this determination made it unnecessary to decide the
additional issue of whether the companies had been deprived of their property without just
compensation. Id. at 866-67, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 829-30.
256. Id. at 858, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25. According to the companies, this decision was
"[tihe straw which broke the camel's back." Id.
257. Id. at 867, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
258. 80 N.J. 548, 404 A. 2d 625 (1979).
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attempt, essentially, to force Nationwide to continue offering re-
newal options in New Jersey on automobile policies. Nationwide,
which alleged these policies were unprofitable, decided against re-
newing these policies although it did not intend to surrender its
certificate of authority to do business in New Jersey.259 The New
Jersey Supreme Court approved a requirement that the Company
offer indefinite renewals unless the company surrendered its li-
cense to do business in New Jersey.26 In so doing, the court re-
jected the company's contention that it was being deprived of its
property without due process of law.261 The court stated that if its
business were unprofitable, the answer was to apply to the Com-
missioner of Insurance for rate increases. 262 Interestingly, the court
concluded that Nationwide was entitled to a reasonable profit and
would have a judicial remedy in the event of an unreasonable rate
structure.26
In sum, the New Jersey Supreme Court was persuaded that a
state may validly require a licensed company to continue at least a
profitable insurance business if it is in the public interest. The
court emphasized, however, that "the insurance business is
strongly affected with a public interest and therefore properly sub-
ject to comprehensive regulation. '264 It is not altogether clear that
the court would apply the same rules to other types of businesses.
A second question which arises is whether a brief advance no-
tice requirement which is carefully tailored to meet a specific need
would be valid. A number of the proposed bills would establish a
two-year advance notice requirement.265 As discussed above, these
may pose a "taking" problem. It appears likely, however, that a
brief advance notice requirement aimed at, for example, insuring
the payment of wages due would not be objectionable.266 In such a
case, the requirement, while potentially forcing an employer
against its will to continue operating a concern for a brief period,
259. Id. at 553, 404 A. 2d at 627. Thus, the case differs factually from Safeco in that
the insurance companies in that case were desirous of withdrawing entirely from doing busi-
ness in New York.
260. Id. at 561, 404 A.2d at 631.
261. Id. at 559-60, 404 A.2d at 630-31. The court clearly treated the issue as one of
deprivation of property without due process of law. Id.
262. Id. at 560, 404 A. 2d at 631.
263. Id. See note 244 and accompanying text supra.
264. 80 N.J. at 559, 404 A. 2d at 630-31.
265. See, e.g., H.R. 13100, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
266. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 41-1-40 (1976). See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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would seem to be a valid exercise of the police power. The interest
involved-payment of wages-is an area of traditional concern to
the states and is already highly regulated. A notice period of a
month or less would be a reasonable regulation that would help
enforce legal requirements as to the payment of wages without un-
necessarily interfering with an employer's ability to operate a busi-
ness as he or she sees fit.
D. Commerce Clause
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposed bills
raise serious commerce clause problems. The United States Consti-
tution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce among the
states.87 While a state is thus prohibited from undertaking to reg-
ulate interstate commerce, it has consistently been held that if a
state statute "regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate lo-
cal public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits. '268 Once a proper local interest is found behind a statute, the
process of determining the constitutionality of the law is essen-
tially a balancing test. The extent of the impact on interstate com-
merce is examined, as is the local interest involved. If the impact
of the law on such commerce is disproportionate to the expected
benefits, or if the local interest could be as adequately protected
with less impairment of interstate commerce, the statute will likely
be overturned.269
The proposed Ohio Community Readjustment Act of 1979270
and similar state bills would appear to pose problems on several
grounds. First, even if one begins with the assumption that a legiti-
mate state interest is involved and that the bill is nondiscrimina-
tory, applying to intrastate as well as to interstate relocations, the
burden or impact on interstate commerce is severe. Businesses
planning to relocate to another state could not do so for two years
after the decision to relocate is made, and then only after paying a
potentially massive bill for severance pay and community readjust-
ment, collectively described by the Wall Street Journal as an "exit
267. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
268. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
269. Id. at 142; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
348-54 (1977).
270. Ohio S.B. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. (1979-80).
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tax." 1 One cannot help but believe that the effect of dislocation
could be dealt with in a less burdensome manner. For example,
unemployment insurance benefits have been available to dislocated
employees for a number of years.27 2 These benefits are paid
through a system that taxes the company payroll to establish a
fund which is available when necessary. The system does not im-
pose a significant burden on interstate commerce. Without getting
into the question of whether or not the availability of unemploy-
ment benefits is an adequate response to business dislocations,
which is inherently a legislative matter, it can be said that substan-
tially the same benefits available under the Ohio Act could be pro-
vided by a small additional payroll tax on covered employers. The
funds generated could be placed in a fund available to make repa-
ration to the appropriate parties in the event of a dislocation. Em-
ployers would, however, be free to make a decision to move their
entire business or portions thereof in interstate commerce free
from undue restrictions.
Another alternative which is available is the general revenue
approach. Again, the same benefits could be provided from general
tax revenues while businesses could still be relocated in interstate
commerce free from burdensome restrictions. The proposed Na-
tional Employment Priorities Act of 1976273 and the readjustment
assistance provisions of the Trade Act of 1974274 typify this ap-
proach. However, this may lead to a philosophical problem. If one
is convinced that dislocating employers are somehow morally re-
sponsible for the social costs generated, a general revenue ap-
proach is inappropriate. A scheme financed by large employers in
general, however, might be more palatable since the costs would be
borne by the class of businesses responsible, if not entirely by the
individual dislocating employers.
Further, it appears, at least to a degree, that the proposed
Ohio Community Readjustment Act of 1979275 is based on the as-
sumption that it is inherently better when Ohio residents enjoy the
fruits of a business than when residents of other states do so. Yet
while the relocation of an Ohio business to, for example, North
Carolina will cause losses to the local economy and hardships for
271. Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1978, at 20, cols. 1-2.
272. See notes 58-82 & accompanying text supra.
273. H.R. 13100, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
274. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-394 (1976); See notes 84-104 & accompanying text supra.
275. Ohio S.B. 188, 113th Gen. Ass. (1979-80).
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local businesses, individuals and communities, there will undoubt-
edly be concomitant benefits to local North Carolina businesses,
individuals and communities. Is Ohio in a position to say that its
residents have a superior claim to these benefits and to enforce
this view by penalizing and restricting relocating employers? This
question presents the very type of situation at which the commerce
clause was aimed. The framers of the Constitution viewed Con-
gress as the body best able to make the determinations necessary
in adjusting competing state interests. In a recent case,276 the Su-
preme Court declared that it has constantly been on guard against
"economic isolation" 2 " and that "where simple economic protec-
tionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of
invalidity has been erected. '278 The Court further noted that the
"evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as leg-
islative ends 27 and that it did not matter whether the article of
commerce is being kept in the state or out of it.2 80 The Court felt
that "[w]hat is crucial is the attempt by one state to isolate itself
from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the
movement of interstate trade. 281
Limits imposed on states in regulating interstate commerce do
not, however, apply to Congress. Thus, a number of the proposals
dealing with business dislocations would be clearly valid if enacted
by Congress. The argument could be made, then, that, at least with
respect to interstate relocations, Congress is the appropriate body
to deal with the problem and legislate a solution.
VII. CONCLUSION
Existing legislation pertaining to business dislocations consists
primarily of unemployment compensation and employment ser-
vices laws.282 A large number of bills have been proposed to deal
specifically with business dislocations, a number of which propose
276. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), noted in Garbage, the Police
Power and the Commerce Clause, 8 CAPrrAL U. L. REv. 613 (1979).
277. 437 U.S. at 623.
278. Id. at 624.
279. Id. at 626.
280. Id. at 628.
281. Id. See also Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, (1928), wherein
the Court stated: "A State is without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade
from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to
satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of the State." Id. at 10.
282. See notes 58-82 & accompanying text supra.
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schemes of stringent regulation. To an extent, these proposed bills
may be representative of a trend to move issues away from the
bargaining table and into the legislative chamber. s3
Several modest suggestions can be made at this time. First,
state legislatures are probably not the appropriate bodies to deal
with the problem of major business dislocations. There are at least
two reasons for this. One is the substantial commerce clause prob-
lem that confronts state regulation in this area.284 The other and
potentially more important reason is that state legislatures will be
unable and, most likely, unwilling to take into account and balance
all of the varied and competing interests involved. The United
States Congress, with representation from different states and geo-
graphic regions, presumably would be. The immediate objection is
that certain groups, most notably legislators from the sunbelt area
will at least initially oppose regulation.28 5 Yet this strengthens
rather than weakens the argument for federal regulation of busi-
ness dislocations. It is precisely these diverse interests which must
be shaped into a reasonable accommodation.
Second, the seriousness of the problem, as well as the strong
support legislation in this area has and will continue to receive,
make it likely that regulation of business dislocations will eventu-
ally occur. 286 These regulations should be structured to deal with
the actual adverse effects of such dislocations and should not be
punitive in nature. 87
Finally, the wisdom of promoting employee ownership should
283. "In essence the labor movement has been moving issues off the bargaining table
and into the public domain, partly because, except for such unions as the auto and steel-
workers, it does not have the power to win what it wants in bargaining." Bus. WK., Sept. 3,
1979, at 28.
284. See notes 267-81 & accompanying text supra.
285. "Congressmen from the Sunbelt states have no desire to discourage plant reloca-
tions, and business groups find two problems with such legislation: it intrudes further into
the management rights area and, they argue, such regulation would penalize companies that
go out of business or move their facilities for valid reasons." Cook, Labor Lines Up on
Plant-Closing Issue, INDUSTRY WK., Sept. 3, 1979, at 24.
286. Michigan has passed an act, signed by the Governor on July 2, 1979, which en-
courages employers to give advance notice of a dislocation and also encourages employee-
owned corporations. 1979 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 44 (codified at MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.
751 et seq. (West Supp. 1979-80)). The Act does not provide authorizations for loans or loan
guarantees. Id.
287. Unfortunately, the bills appear to be more punitive in nature each year. Com-
pare, e.g., the National Employment Priorities Act of 1976, H.R. 13100, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.




be re-examined.288 If an approach which promotes such ownership
is adopted, adequate safeguards against unsound investments must
be provided.
288. See notes 184-200 & accompanying text supra.
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